Almost a full eight years into the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, there are still three institutional sources of violence in the country: the Taliban, the warlords, and the foreign occupation. Each of these institutions feed off each other, generating a vicious cycle that Afghanistan appears unable to break.

The only winning strategy in Afghanistan is reconstruction. No modernized army, no precision-guided missiles from unmanned aircraft, no democratic elections, no secular government, no decapitation of the insurgency’s leadership, and not even ridding the country of the burqa will secure the country. What is needed – purely and simply – is massive reconstruction: economic development, substantial infrastructure, agricultural and land reforms, an educational genesis, and healthcare facilities.

Aside from obvious statistics that catch the ethno-centric eyes of major U.S. media outlets (i.e., 2009 being the deadliest year for U.S. troops), the reality for Afghans is much worse. Today’s coordinated bombings in Kandahar, killing more than 40 civilians, is just one such sign.

Adding to the Taliban’s indiscriminate attacks are the ongoing U.S. airstrikes from unmanned drones, which often seem just as indiscriminate, essentially forming a nasty de facto cooperation between the Taliban and Western forces that terrorizes the civilian population.

Our bombs from the skies – killing villagers, elders, children, and wedding parties along the way – recruit more Taliban insurgents. Insurgents who otherwise might have been secular-minded, progressive, and liberal – until Grandma was blown up by an airstrike because someone safely ensconced in a military base hundreds of miles away was told the #2 terrorist was meeting at her neighbor’s home. Once an insurgent joins the fight, they are simultaneously indoctrinated into extremist ideology, and an understandable resentment of foreign occupation turns into a religious obligation.

[...U.S.-led airstrikes killed 555 civilians in 2008 (of those reported). Compare that to the 730 killed by Taliban suicide bombings...]

When NATO forces account for almost the same number and percentage of civilian deaths as the Taliban’s suicide bombs…well, we’ve lost that war.

The foreign occupation is also fueling the warlords and their grip on the country. Briefcases of money are doled out to those landowners and tribal leaders who are willing to sell their loyalty. Warlords that have ruled through terror and an unequal accumulation of wealth and power see the foreign military as a way to further their personal quest for control. They become power brokers, choosing leaders and politicians, directing legislation, running the opium trade, and all the while settling decades-old feuds and personal vendettas. The U.S. military incorrectly believes that because these warlords are not “religious Muslims,” they are a natural ally.

[...do you think Afghans care if the guy behind the automatic machine gun mounted on a pickup calls himself a "Taliban" or "Warlord?"...]

Except the “tip” that someone was probably paid for that claimed the #2 terrorist was meeting in some village came from one of these warlords – and, conveniently, some of the “collateral damage” happened to be members of his rival’s gang.  That sort of makes us paid assassins…

Critics of the idea that our presence might be making things worse (or “patriots” as they will call themselves) claim that leaving Afghanistan to the Taliban would be akin to turning over Germany to the Nazis during World War II (they always conveniently leave out the warlords, since I guess we consider these murderers our allies). Ignoring the discredited logic that equates every scenario to the Nazis or Hitler, there is a major flaw in this criticism.

Once the Nazi regime was toppled in Germany, the U.S. moved into massive reconstruction. The vacuum created by the fall of the Nazis was replaced with economic recovery, foreign assistance, and – essentially – hope.  The foreign occupation was largely ignored because so much else was going on to improve the lives of ordinary Germans.

While we followed up the toppling of the Nazis in Germany with years of economic reconstruction, we have followed the fall of the Taliban in early 2002 with years of military occupation and military funding.

Between 1946 and 1952, the U.S. alone supplied Germany with more than $29 billion (adjusted for inflation) in reconstruction aid. Of that total, only about 10% – $3 billion – was for the military. The rest was used for economic recovery and emergency food aid. (Japan received about $15 billion during the same period – with only $600,000 for the military.)

That is how you win hearts and minds – and avoid a decade-long insurgency.

Afghanistan, on the other hand, in roughly the same time span (2001-2008) has received almost $38 billion in US aid.  Tragically, more than $22 billion – or 58% – was military aid.  How can we expect to build peace with so much money for war?

And of course, none of that takes into account the fact that much of this aid in Afghanistan is used to pay private (Western) contractors for the reconstruction projects (instead of hiring local Afghans, much as the Marshall Plan hired local Germans). These figures also don’t reflect the massive corruption and funds skimmed by those same warlords that claim to be our allies, nor the massive bureaucratic costs for the (Western) “consultant” community in the guise of humanitarian experts. Nor does it break down how much of this “aid” is really just briefcase bribes to (again) the warlords.

Without a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan – one that genuinely seeks to reconstruct the country at the local level – we are facing another decade of violence. Another decade of “troop surges” and “climbing casualties.” Another decade of rampant corruption and crime by the warlords, and infinitely more rounds of “let’s kill another #2 terrorist so we can look good for a day in the newspapers.”

And Afghans are facing yet another decade of “collateral damage,” horrible life expectancy and infant mortality rates, and poverty.